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red fape n tso called from the red tape formerly used to tie up 
legal documents in England]: bureaucratic procedure, espe- 
cially as  characterized by mechanical adherence to  regulations, 
needless duplication of records, and the compilation of an  
excessive amount of extraneous information resulting in pro- 
longed delay or inaction. (Webster's 3rd International Diction- 
ary). 
Red tape is an  irritation that most people accept with a certain 
amount of fatalism, like catching colds in winter. Just as medical science 
has had little impact on the common cold, management science and 
information technology seem to have had little effect on reducing bureau- 
cratic red tape. It seems to be a natural by-product of organizational and 
societal rationalization. 
Office automation, however, v:ould seem to have as an  implicit goal 
the reduction of red tape. Part of t h s  is (rightly) seen as the elimination 
of paper flows. Documenis can be handled much more quickly and effi- 
ciently in electronic form than as physical paper. But there is another 
component to red tape, a sociological one, which tends to be ignored. 
Red tape arises as authority structures become specialized and distri- 
buted across numerous organizational roles. 
Much of xha t  sve call red tape involves the processing of a particular 
request through a series of authority nodes (typically offices) in the 
organization. Thus another part of the problem, beyond speed of com- 
munications, is the resource time a t  these nodes -i .e. ,  the time taken by 
the particular clerk or manager to authorize the request. Still another 
pari  is finding the appropriate zuthorities in the first place. (Another 
piece of informal terminology applies here: 'passing tne buck.') 
The general argument we want to make is that the problem of red 
tape involves not merely information flows but also authority flows. Here 
we do not mean the broad types of authority typically drawn on organiza- 
tion charts, but rather  the detailed, formalized types of authority 
prescribed in bureaucratic rules and regulations. An important aspect is 
that  often these types of authority have also come to be ritualized, that  
is, no longer relevant to the organization's interests. 
Authority is of course a sociological phenomenon. That is not to say 
it is not analyzable. The more specific point of this paper is to sketch a n  
approach to the analysis of red tape. 
The approach is introduced through a linguistic distinction between 
performative vs informative documents. These are regarded as the basic 
medium of bureaucratic authority. These are generally recognized by the 
inclusion of a signature by the authorizing person or a special stamp or 
seal of the authorizing office. The sociological importance of the non- 
duplicatability of these documents is discussed. 
The content of authoritative documents is analyzed using the primi- 
tive operators of deontic logic (obligation, permission, prohibition). The 
relationship of these distinctions to a broader theory of bureaucracy is 
examined, and a concept of bureaucratic software is suggested. 
DOING THINGS WITH WORDS 
The linguistic concept of a performative was first introduced by Aus- 
tin (1962) and elaborated by Searle (1969) and others. The performative 
aspects of contracts and financial instruments was discussed in Lee 
(1980, 1981). The relevance of performatives to office processes was first 
noted by Flores (198 1). 
A performative is an utterance that not only conveys information but 
also, by its being spoken, accomplishes some socially significant act.  For 
instance, the sentence "I now pronounce you man and wife" when spoken 
by a priest during a marriage ceremony not only describes the relation- 
ship between the couple, but actually creates it. Ths  example brings out 
several key features of performatives. One is that  the state created by 
such an utterance is generally some type of social artifact. Obviously, the 
mere speaking of a few words has very little physical effect. Rather, it 
places one or more people in different states of social perception. Often, 
this invo!ves a certain set  of obligations. e.g.,  of fidelity, econonic respon- 
sibility. 
The roles involved in a linguistic utterance are usually cast as 
speaker and listener. However, in the case of performatives, the listener 
role must be divided between 'addressees' and 'by-standers'. Clearly, not 
everybody attending the marriage ceremonj7 becomes socially obligated 
by the priest's pronouncement, only the tv:o people specificalljr 
addressed. 
Also, i t  is not always the addressees of performatives who acquire the 
social obligation by the utterance. For instance, a major class of perfor- 
matives is the class of promises, in whch case it is the speaker who 
acquires the obligation. In other cases the addressee may in fact be an 
object, e.g., a s h p :  "I christen them the Queen Elizabeth." These latter 
are, however, fairly rare types of performatives, 
The social contract surrounding a performative is not always institu- 
tional, as with marriage. For instance, such remarks as "I promise to do 
the dishes tomorrow," are also performatives. In this paper, however, our 
attention is limited to performatives in institutional environments. In 
these cases the speaker and addressee must have certain social qualifica- 
tions in order for the performative to have force. For example, only pri- 
ests, ministers, ship captains, justices of the peace, etc.,  can pronounce 
marriages, and only unmarried couples of a certain age can become mar- 
ried. Further, apart from the broad social context that enables the per- 
formative to have force, for instance the church as an  institution, there is 
also a narrower, 'conversational' context where the performative must 
appear; e.g., the marriage pronouncement must appear at  a certain point 
near the end . f th5 marriage ceremony, not at  the beginmng, nor after- 
wards, during !Ye reception, etc. 
Linguists generally refer to performatives as a type of utterance, 
that is, a spolrer, ~o~mmunication. What is sometimes overlooked is that 
written communications, too, may be performative. In these cases, how- 
ever, the exe~ut ion  of the performative takes on a somewhat hfferent 
character. In a spoken performative, the person making the performa- 
tive is obi7iousIy identified as the speaker. In written performatives, the 
issue of auLh.orship ariszs. Also, with spoken performatives the addressee 
hears the performative a t  the tirn.e it is spoken. IYritten communications, 
however, e n d r e  throughout ti.me ancl so the addressee may receive the 
cornmunicatic.:> considerably later than when it v;as initially made. The 
question then arises: when during t l s  interval does the performative 
come into force? 
These issues of authorshp and timing are commonly resolved by a 
very simple device, namely the author's handwritten signature, accom- 
panied by the date on w l c h  i t  was signed. The ritual of signing one's 
name to a document is so pervasive that its fundamental role is often not 
recognized. Indeed, as a rough heuristic, one can usually distinguish 
purely informative documents from those with a performative component 
by whether or not it has a personal signature. For instance, printed 
announcements, bulletins, etc.,  seldom have signatures; contracts to pay 
money (checks, etc.) always do. The effect of the signature is roughly the 
declaration: 
"I hereby a c k ~ o ~ ~ l e d g e  that my beliefs and intentions are accu- 
rately described by this associated text." 
Signed documents, as performative instruments, also acquire a unique 
feature not possessed by their purely informative counterparts: the per- 
formative effect of the original signature is not carried over to its 
mechanical duplicates. For instance, in legal documents, such as con- 
tracts, wills, eic.,  when several copies are made, each must be separately 
signed by the author:;) to  have legal validity. 
The unique role of the original in written performatives has, by the 
way, its co?mterpart in spoken performatives as well: repeated playbacks 
of a tape recording of a spoken promise, for instance, do not create new 
promises. With written performatives the assumption of course is that 
the signatme provides a unique identification of the author. However, the 
authenticity of the signature is seldom called into question (handwriting 
analysts are seldom needed in court). A more important effect is that it 
signals the author's declaration of personal responsibility.for the associ- 
ated statements. In the act of signing such a document the signer typi- 
cally becomes acutely aware of its languzge and contents (especially if 
the text has been written by someone else, as in a standardized lease or 
loan contract), since (s)he is henceforth expected to behave in accor- 
dance with t b s  declaration. 
The social significance of this ritual, committing the signer to having 
the beliefs, attitudes or intentions as expressed in the document, has 
been accepted by nearly every literate culture for centuries. I t  is a 
extremely useful lxstorical convention, being the hallmark of honesty and 
good faith in all kinds of institutional and governmental transactions and 
agreements. I t  should be noted, ho:vever, that a signature is not the only 
way of marking a performative document. In many cases, a special seal, 
stamp or sticker operates similarly, especially where the effect of the 
document is standardized and commonplace. Typically, these special 
performative symbols are designed with a special, intricate pattern that 
would be hard to mimic. Often, these serve effectively as the signature of 
an institution, rather than a single individual. Common examples are 
coins, bills, and postage stamps. 
DEONTIC PEFF0IL'.LAT~T.s' 
In the context of organizational procedures, the 
informative/performative distinction can be refined further. One aspect 
of these procedures is certainly to transmit and store information. 
Another, h o ~ e v e r ,  is to control and standardize the behavior of the per- 
sonnel involved. Procedures are thus means of standardizing the exer- 
cises of a u t h o ~ i t y  of certain individuals in the organization over others. 
Authority, of course, includes a wide variety of aspects. With regard 
to red tape, however, one particular form of authority seems prominent. 
Ths  is where a certain type of behavior is in general forbidden, except 
under special circumstances. The exercise of authority in these cases 
amounts to  some person's evaluation of the circumstances, and the 
granting of permission where appropriate. In many instances of red tape 
the action in question is divided into a number of sub-actions each requir- 
ing separate permission. The delay or inaction inherent in the definition 
of red tape thus results not for reasons of information collection or pro- 
cessing, but rather due to the  wait times in the personal queues of these 
various permission granting individuzls. 
A familiar example of this is automobile registration. In general it is 
forbidden to drive an automobile on public roads. There are,  however, 
several conditions that together permit this. First, the driver needs to be 
able to drive This is demonstrated by an examination by state employ- 
ees with the authority to certify driving skills. If the driver succeeds in 
this exam, the examiner signs the examination form that permits the 
driver to obtain a specially designed (performative) card,  the driver's 
license. 
Next, one must have an  automobile. I n  purchasing the auto, another 
special form is required - the  bill of sale and/or title certificate -wbiich 
is signed by both the previous and new owners (another performative 
document). Next, the automobile itself must be in safe driving condition. 
Here, a different individual, e.g., a state licensed mechanic, makes the 
certification. T h s  is typically signified by a special (again performative) 
sticker attached to the auto's windshield or fender, signed by the 
mechanic. Next, if not already done, the vehcle must be registered, i.e., 
recorded in  the state books. Here, typically, the vehicle manufacturer's 
serial number is recorded by another state agent on another special 
form, whch (s)he signs. This permits the owner to obtain a license plate 
for the auto (analogous to a performative seal). Lastly, in some places, a 
separate road tax must be paid. Here again, receipt of payment is ack- 
nowledged by a special receipt form and/or sticker (more performative 
items). 
The sum of all these procedures amounts to permission from the 
state to drive the vehicle on its public roads. Note that  the component 
performatires in this case were sometimes marked by a signature, some- 
times by a special sea! or sticker, and sometimes both. 
Similar types of permission structures exist within organizations. 
Here a common example is the request of some department to purchase 
a large item. Often such a request must be approved by a number of indi- 
viduals to verify for instance that the item is technically sound, compati- 
ble with similar items in the organization, competitively priced, etc. In 
each step along the way, the permission performance is inevitably sig- 
naled by the signature cf the authorizing individual. 
Another common type of orgznization performative is order giving. 
Interestingly, this seems to be a more efficient process than permission 
granting. The difference seems to be that orders are generally given by a 
single indn~idual to a number of others, whereas permission often needs 
to be granted by a number of people together for a sirgle person. For 
this reason, perhaps, order giving seems less involved in the concept of 
red tape. 
There is, however, an  interesting duality between permission grant- 
ing and order giving. This was first observed by the logician Georg Henrik 
von Wright (1966) in what he called a 'deontic' logic. The term 'deontic' is 
derived from a Greek term meaning roughly 'ought' or 'obliged'. This 
logic is thus an  effort to formalize the aspects of obligation. 
Let "q" symbolize some particular type of action. Then the following 
operators are introduced: 
0 q (q is obligatory) 
P q (q  is permitted) 
F q (4 is forbidden/prohibited) 
Without going into any more logical dethils, two interesting points 
can be brought out. The first is that permission and prohibition are 
negates. That is, to permit some action is not to forbid it and vice versa. 
Symbolically, 
The more interesting insight, however, is that  obligation and permis- 
sion are logical duals. Tnat is, to be obliged to perform some action, q, is 
equivalent to not being permitted not to do it. Conversely, being permit- 
ted to do a certain action is to not be obliged not to do it. Symbolically, 
The relevance of t h s  to the discussion a t  hand is that it suggests a family 
of what might be called 'deontic performatives' that are inter-definable. 
A deontic performative document is one that obliges, permits or forbids 
some action. These are  important in that they indicate the link between 
performative documents and authority structures. 
Let x an2 y indicate two people or roles in the organization. Then 
the preceding notation can be modified to indicate three basic types of 
authoritative action: 
(x 0 y) q = x orders y to q 
(x P y) q = x permits y to q 
(x Fy)  q = x forbids y to q 
The enabling requirement in each of these cases is that x has the author- 
ity (within the organization) to control y's behavior in doing q. The argu- 
ment we want to make is that signed, performative documents nearly 
always signal a change in deontic status. 
Lee (1980 and 1931) analyzes the deontic structure of contractual 
relationshps be tween  organizations. Indeed, nearly all inter- 
organizational transactions - with the exception of cash sales - in~olve a 
\ deontic aspect. 
For example, credit sales and bank loans, bonds, certain types of 
preferred stock, etc, create a n  obligation to a later payment action. 
insurance contracts establish a contingent obligation of the insurer to the 
insuree. Easements and licenses of various hnds  establish a permission 
relationship between the parties. 
In each case, the signing of the contract creates a change in deontic 
status. For example, signing a bank note creates an obligation to pay 
that previously did not exist. An easement creates a permission to lim- 
ited use of another's land, altering the general prohibition against 
trespassing. 
Our suggestion here is t h z t  a similar view aapplies to transactions 
within an  organization. The red  tape u i t h n  organizations shares many 
characteristics of contractual relationships between organizations. 
In the last  couple of decades, the analysis of document processing 
and flows in organizations has become closely coupled with efforts t o  
apply computer based information technology to the task .  The most sub- 
stantial change introduced when a particular document process is 
automated is t h a t  the documents themselves no longer have a fixed phy- 
sical counterpart  a s  paper ,  bu t  a re  instead only magnetic or  electronic 
pat terns .  This offers enormous flexibility for information transmission 
and processing; transfer of the  document from one geographic location t o  
another is effectively instantaneous. Likewise, several people can  simul- 
taneously work on different par t s  of the  document a t  the same time, 
since they may all access  a centralized representation of it. 
Whle t h s  technology is especially well-suited to  handling the infor- 
mative content of documents,  i t  does not accommodate documents hav- 
ing a perfomatwe aspect .  This is due to  the fact tha t  in paper form, a 
performative document  has  a physical uniqueness tha t  it loses when con- 
verted t o  a magnetic medium. For physical representations, we have 
clearly developed concepts of individuality and uniqueness. When we 
move a physical document from one place to  another,  we know for 
instance, tha t  it is the same document; whereas, if we see two duplicate 
documents, we know they  a r e  not  t he  same since they occupy different 
physical locations a t  the  same time. 
The sameness problem is an old phi loso~hzal  chestnut. It is often 
illustrated by the so-called 'ship of Theseus.' Imagine a wooden boat. We 
replace one plenk. Is it the same boat? Kow systematically replace all 
the planks. Is the second boat now- the original boat? (A whole navy of 
the same s h p  can be built by iterating this process). Clearly, where we 
draw the line bet~~reen the original boat and its duplicates is a matter of 
consensus. And that is the key point about performative paper - the 
uniqueness characteristic is a matter of long developed social convention. 
Kent, (1978), discusses similar difficulties in the context of database 
design. 
In electronic form, the original recording of a document is indistin- 
guishable from any of its duplicates. Indeed, what appears as the elec- 
tronic movement of a document from one pIace to another is actually 
copying its information pattern from one magnetic device to another, 
then erasing the original. Thus, the concepts of individuality and unique- 
ness of an original and its copies become blurred when a document is 
converted to magnetic form. Our social conventions delineating unique- 
ness are  not yet refined for electronic media. 
Strawson (1959) presents philosophical discussion of the individua- 
tion problem. He observes that the entities for whch  we have a clear 
concept of individuality and uniqueness are those that can be situated, 
either directly or by a unique chain of associations, in the general frame- 
work of space and time. 
Thus, hard, physical objects which undergo only minor transf orma- 
tions have a unique location in the spatial temporal framework a t  any 
point in time. More diffuse objects are more difficult to individuate. An 
example might be a disease. Asserting that two patients hare the same 
disease typically means thzt the bacieria or virus are biologically of a 
common category, or it may mean that they are of a common population. 
The latter assertion includes a conjecture of contagion. A population has 
a spatial/temporal location whereas a generic type does not. 
Mo~lng into the domain of conceptual objects individuation becomes 
more difficult. Consider for instance a musical composition. Vie may 
know it through various performanies or its various representstions as 
printed musical scores. But to claim that any two of these are the same 
typically reduces down to identifying a chain of reproductions back to a 
original event when the piece was composed, i.e., locating i t  in 
space/time. 
Other conceptual entities whose hstorical origins have been forgot- 
ten are notoriously difficult to individuate. For example, people typically 
distinguish various forms of socialism by relating them to their original 
authors, e.g., Marxism, Maoism. However, the various forms of capitalism 
are not so clearly distinguished, since the hstorical origins are not so 
well known. 
In database management it is common to distinguish between type 
and ins tance.  A typical example is the generic concept EMPLOYEE vs 
individual instances of employees, John Doe, Mary Smith, etc. Our point 
here is that this distinction is fairly well understood in the case of physi- 
cal objects, but becomes blurred as one considers less tangible entities. 
The above example of music compositions is an important intermedi- 
ate case. Books and other printed materials have similar individuation 
characteristics, namely that they are easily reproducible (Thompson 
1961). Compl~zter software and data have this feature in the extreme. 
Indeed, in virtual memory systems and distributed databases, a partizu- 
lar program or data set may be automatically copied to and from hun- 
dreds of locations without the user's awareness. It is the extremely facile 
reproduzibi!ity of computer media that presents a challenge to the 
management of performative documents, for these require non- 
reproducibility. 
But why does originality and uniqueness of representation play such 
an  important role in the case of performative documents? Basically, it is 
due to the above mentioned observation that the document serves as 
social evidence of someone's personal commitment to a belief, attitude, 
or intention. In physical form t h s  evidence is much easier to control, 
e.g., 1 can void a check by tearing it up. The cases where t b s  is most sen- 
sitive are when the document serves to obligate the author (or sometimes 
another party) to the performance of some actions, for instance, paying a 
sum of money. Here i t  is essential that the document have a unique. 
non-duplicable representation so that the author cannot be forced into 
further obligations by simple mechanical reproduction. 
Note that encryption methods for producing digital signatures (e.g., 
Diffie and Hellman 1979) do not address this particular problem. They 
guarantee the identities of the sender an recipient of a communication, 
but do not block the reproducibility of the document once it has been 
received. 
The major application of computer management of perf ormative 
documents is the case of electronic funds transfer system (EFTS), used 
for fincncial transfers between banks and other financial institutions. 
Here the individuation problem is controlled by a neutral third party (the 
Federal Reserve in the US), which monitors the transactions and insures 
against illegal reproduction. 
T h s  is similar to the  role of a witness in verbal contracts, or to the  
role of a notary in other types of legal transactions. The notary function, 
or some analogous form of social convention, is one way of resolving the 
individuation problem arising from the electronic representation of per- 
formative communications. Unfortunately, t h s  increases the amount of 
human overhead of the system's operation and so reduces its 
cost/effectiveness. 
The medium for representing deontic performatives, discussed in the 
last section, is only one aspect of the red tape problem. Here we investi- 
gate certain aspects of the contents of deontic performatives and their 
relationshp to the nature of bureaucracies. 
The term "bureaucracy", as both a popular and scientific term, has 
come to have a variety of often overlapping definitions. The definition 
used here is due to Weber (1956/1978). To Weber, the process of bureau- 
cratization is a shift from organizational management based on the  
interests and personalities of specific individuals, to one based on explicit 
d e s  and +rocedures. These rules and procedures are identified with 
roles in the organization rather than individual people. Bureaucratic 
organizatioi~s thus take on an impersonal, mechanical character. To 
Weber, this is a positive development leadirz to greater effectiveness and 
efficiency: 
Bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is "dehu- 
manized," the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from 
official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, 
and emotional elements which escape calculation (Weber 
1956/19?8:975). 
Bureaucrazie s in this sense are becoming of increasing importance 
in both planned and free market economies though the roles are some- 
what different. 
In a planned economy, the rationalization of management is central 
to the ideology. However, to Marx, bureaucracy was a major evil to be 
abolished: 
Bureaucracy becomes an autonomous and oppressive force 
which is felt by the majority of the people as a mysterious and 
distant entity - as something which, although regulating their 
lives, is beyond their control and comprehension, a sort of divin- 
ity in the face of which one feels helpless and bewildered 
(quoted in Abrahamsson i9?7:38). 
Here the term 'bureaucracy' is used in a slightly different sense from 
Weber, denoting government bureaucracies in particular. The relevance 
for Marx was that these are an important concentration of social power 
In market economies, bureaucracy seems to be regarded more as a 
concession to inadequacies in market mechanisms. Here we need to dis- 
tinguish bureaucracy from hierarchy. Williamson (1973) discusses 'mark- 
ets vs hierarchies' as a problem of economic organization. In certain 
cases resources are allocated via market mechanisms, in other cases 
they are allocated within an organizational hierarchy, which may be 
under either public or private control. Hierarchies become bureaucra- 
cies (ln the sense used here) when their administration becomes rational- 
ized, embodied in explicit rules. In the case of berarchical organizations 
in the private sector, this rationalization process tends to evolve gradu- 
ally, as the organization discovers regularity in its environment 
Governmental hierarches,  by contrast, are typically created by 
legislation and so become bureaucracies from the outset. Downs 
(1967:32,31) cites a number of factors for the creation of governmental 
hierarchies. One is the case of consumer goods with large 'external' costs 
or benefits. An external cost or benefit is one not reflected in the good's 
f ree  market price40r instance, the smog created by automobile exhaust, 
or non-biodegradable detergents which pollute rivers. The point is that 
market mechanisms do not take these external costs into account in 
selecting an equilibrium consumption level. To compensate for these 
inadequacies, a bureaucracy is often created. 
The rationalization of organizations, in itself, would seem to be 
inherently positive and equitable. Indeed, this is the implicit goal bebnd  
most of management science and operational research. However, there 
seems to be an undesirable side effect that accounts for much of the 
negative connotations we attach to the term bureaucracy, namely, that 
hghly rationalized organizations apparently become mflexible and 
unresponsive to changes in the environment. Weber comments: 
Once fully established, bureaucracy is among those social struc- 
ture which are hardest to destroy. Bureaucracy is the means of 
transforming social action into rationally organized action . . .  the 
ruled, for their part,  cannot dispense with or replace the 
bureaucratic apparatus once i t  exists, for i t  rests upon expert 
training, a functional specialization of work, and an attitude set 
on habitual virtuositj7 in the mastery ~f single yet methodically 
integrated functions.. .
Such an apparatus makes "revolution," in the sense of forceful 
creation of entirely new formations of authority, more and more 
impossible-technically, because of its control over the modern 
means of communication (telegraph, etc.) ,  and also because of 
its increasingly rationalized inner structure (IVeber 
1956/1976:987-989). 
One aspect - at  least in market economies - for the unresponsive- 
ness of bureaucracies is that they typically have achieved a monopolistic 
or protected position where they are not forced to change by competitive 
pressures. Nonetheless, newly elected politicians and corporate 
presidents often recognize and attempt to relieve the problem, though 
typically with little success. 
Jay Galbraith (1973, 1977) offers a useful framework for analyzing 
the problem. A currently popular theory of organizations is the informa- 
tion processing viev:, due principally to Simon (e.g.,  Simon 1955, March 
and Simon 195B). The key concern is how the organization co?es with the 
complexity of its environment, given the bounded rationality (cognitive 
limitations) of its managers. Galbraith extends the information process- 
ing view of organizations, to a 'contingency theory' approach. He regards 
the complexity of the organizations task as only one dimension of its 
information processing difficulties. 
Another dimension is added to the organizational design problem, 
what Galbraith calls uncertainty. This refers t o  the degree of unpredicta- 
bility of the tasks performed in the organization: 
Uncertainty is defined as the difference between the amount of 
information required to perform the task and the amount of 
information already possessed by the organization (1973:5). 
The importance of this relates to the organization's ability to plan or 
pre-program its activities 
The greater the task uncertainty, the greater the amount of 
information that must be processed among decision makers 
during task execution in order to acheve a given level of perfor- 
mance (1973:4). 
Galbraith classifies the nature of the organization's overall cognitive 
task (as vell as any of its subtasks) on a two dimensional framework of 
complexity and uncertainty. Tiis may be viev:ed as a matrix (Figure 1) 
characterizing the different types of cognitive tasks which organizations 
face. In situations of high complexity but low uncertainty, the organiza- 
tion is able to plan and routinize its activities. These are the conditions 
when bureaucracy is mast effective. In situations of low complexity and 
high uncertainty, by contrast, the organizztion is constantly being 
surprised by changes in the environment. Here, the most effective form 
of administration seems to be one that relies heavily on the discretian of 
its employees. Burns and Stalker (1961) use the terms 'mechanical' and 
'organic' to describe these contrasting forms of administration. 
The problem, of course, is what form of administration is appropriate 
when the environmental demands are both highly complex and hghly 
uncertain. 
As observed, rationalization is the typical response to  complexity. 
An apparent difficulty with rationalization, however, is that when a once 
stable environment becomes more uncertain, the organization seems to  
have difficulties de-rationalizing, that is, removing rules and procedures 
and relying more on individual discretion in order to become more adap- 
uncertainty 
mechanical 
(bureaucratic) 
Figure 1 
have difficulties de-rationalizing, that is, removing rules and procedures 
and relying more on individual discretion in order to become more adap- 
tive. One factor is likely to be that it has reached a level of internal com- 
plexity that  cannot be maintained in a less rationalized type of organiza- 
tion. 
The desired response would be to move quickly to  another hghly 
rationalized conflguration. However the complex of bureaucratic pro- 
cedures represents a large scale intellectual effort of many people over 
time. Bureaucracies are not built in a day. The time required to con- 
struct a new configuration may be too long compared to the ra te  of 
environmental change. 
The information processing views invite the comparison between 
(human) organizations and (mechanical) computers. However, people 
have a characteristic that  computers (as we know them) do not have, 
namely preferences (intrinsic goals, values, drives, motivations, etc.).  
People mapprefer chocolate to vanilla, computers don't. 
Computer programs are composed of commands. We can describe 
their behavior in a logic of imperatives, where the default is inaction. 
However, as argued in much of the recent sociological literature on 
organizations, people are not naturally idle (Maslow 1943, McGregor 1960, 
Cyert and March 1963, Karch and Olsen 1979). Ths  leads to the observa- 
tion that a major effect of bureaucratic red tape is not to invoke action 
but rather to constrain it .  It is for t h s  reason that deorstic logic, rather 
than imperative logic, is here suggested as the appropriate model of 
bureaucratic authority. Subordinates are not automatons. Bureaucratic 
rules and procedures restrain rather than dictate their behavior. (Con- 
sider the union strategy 'work to rule' which can be nearly as effective as 
strikes in worker protests.) 
An important aspect of bureaucracies is the substitutability of per- 
sonnel. This is accomplished through detailed job descriptions, which 
prescribe and limit the  activities of the people in these roles. It is 
through this device tha t  the bureaucracy maintains a uniformity of 
response throughout its geographical and temporal extension. Idiosyn- 
cratic behavior of individuals is restricted in a complex of prohibitions, 
obhgations and permissions. 
In the bureaucratic philosophy, idiosyncratic behavior is regarded as 
bad, somethng to be eliminated. The implicit assumption is that this 
behavior will not be directed towards the organization's goals, but to 
purely personal ones. However, idiosyncratic behavior which furthers the 
organization's interest is initiative. This is the source of adaptation and 
innovation. 
In the matrix drawn above the unexplained quadrant included organi- 
zations facing environments that are both highly complex and highly unc- 
ertain. Yet such organizations exist and flourish - e.g., IBM, Dupont, Gen- 
eral Electric, as well as 'Japan Inc.'. Deal and Kennedy (1982) introduce 
an additional explanatory component in their concept of 'corporate cul- 
tures'. From a number of case studies of large corporations in various 
industries and circumstances, they observe 'strong culture' to be an 
important success factor. Culture is of course a difficult variable to 
define. 
They intend it in the anthropological sense indicating a commonality 
of interests, beliefs, and values. Further, this is not an accidental coin- 
cidence: people identify themselves as members of the culture and 
accept the collective views and interests as major influences on their own. 
Thus in such multi-culture countries as Switzerland, Canada, or Belgium, 
there are few remaining racial differences between the cultural sub- 
groups. Rather people become members of the culture at  birth and are 
socialized to accept the local norms and habits. Amongst these dialect is 
an especially important aspect of cultural identification (e.g., Swiss- 
German vs Austrian German vs Bavarian German). 
Identification and socialization are major aspects of corporate cu!- 
tures as well. Initiation into the culture begins with employment inter- 
views which are often conducted v,lth great care. Deal and ECennedy cite 
an example from Tandem, Inc. ( to them, a strong culture company) 
where an employee was interviewed four times for a position as purchas- 
ing clerk. The point is that these companies screen very carefully for cul- 
tural compatibility. 
Once accepted, the socialization in these companies is very strong. 
Aside from normal task related concerns, these companies sustain ela- 
borate structures of corporate ceremonies, mottos, heros, and legends. 
The employee, in ad2ition to membership in the social culture, is rein- 
forced in his/her membership in the organizational culture. Thus whle 
Americans, French, Germans, etc,  each share certain similarities in men- 
tality, work ethics and values, so too do the IBM, the Procter and Gamble, 
the General Electric cultures, even though they span several social cul- 
tures. 
Through membershp in the organizational culture, employees do not 
necessarily come to t h n k  alike, but rather they think t oge ther .  Rather 
than simply following bureaucratically defined communications channels, 
the informal communication becomes an important integrating aspects. 
Informal socializing is a n  major aspect in all organizations. The key point 
here is that in a strong corporate cultures it becomes organizationally 
directed. 
Through socialization, the organization's goals are a strong influence 
on the employee's goals. Personal interest tends to correspond more 
closely with the organization's interest. On the other hand, the 
organization's interests are more like!y to be influenced by the consen- 
sual interests of its employees as well. Since the employees maintain a 
dual cultural menbership, in the organization an6 in the surrounding 
society, the employees' influence helps to ensure a more appropriate 
relationshp between the organization and its social environ-ment. 
kW<liGING BTURX&TJCF-5.TIC S9?"ITCAFE 
The concept of corporate culture is an enthusiastic one. It has some- 
tbng  of the flavor of a large scale football rally, conplete with not tos  
such as 'progress is our most important product' (General Electric), 
'better tbngs  for better living through chemistry' (Du Pont), and so on. 
However, a football team does not succeed only on team spirit. Rationaii- 
zation is also important, e .g. ,  football plays, specialized skills of the 
players. Lilre~vise, rationalization is a vital complement to organizational 
culture. The point is that ,  to be effective, it mustn't  supercede the cld- 
ture ( t h s  applies on a societal level as wel!). Rationalization is a tool, a 
component of administration, but not the whole t hng .  
This suggests that rationalization 1s a t b g  to be managed, just as 
the organization manages other assets and technology. The information 
processing metaphor invites a concept of 'bureaucratic software1.* 
Bureaucratic software is the collection of rules, procedures, job descrip- 
tions, etc. in the organization. The issue is whether this can be managed, 
perhaps drawing on the experiences from managing computer software. 
Indeed, the metaphor converzos at  the level of automation in the organi- 
Dobrw (1978) has a related concept he calls 'orgware' 
zation, computerization being an extreme form of rationalization (Lee 
1983a). 
The advantages of a consept of bureaucratic software would be to 
apply such concepts as program libraries and various programmer aids 
to the design and maintenance of organizational rules and procedures. 
The eventual goal vrould be towards improved bureaucratic software 
engineering. 
This raises the issue of language. Bureaucratic software a t  present is 
largely in a natural language form. However, it typically occurs in a res- 
tricted style and content, somevi.hat like the 'legalese' of commercial con- 
tracts or legislation. There is little poetry in job descriptions and pro- 
cedure manuals. The conjecture is that an substantial part  of this could 
be codified in a more formal language, capable of mechanical inference. 
It is here that mechanical aids could be developed to aid in the adapta- 
tion of bureaucratic structures. The difficulty, as with computer 
software, is in assessing the consequence of a proposed change (Lee 
lQ83b). Bureaucratic procedures, like subroutine calls, inter-lock in a 
complex network. We need aids to reduce the intellectual overhead. 
As discussed above, the underlying structure of bureaucratic 
software languages is deontic rather than simply imperative. (Further 
epistemological and semantic issues are discussed in Lee (1980 and 
1981)). The essential difference is that humans, as information proces- 
sors, have individual preferences, motivations, ego which is vital to the 
organizational culture. This is the source of initiative, enabling organiza- 
tional adaptability and innovation. These aspects are constrained by con- 
siderations of efficiency and coordination. A t  present they are also 
constrained by our inability to effectively manage complex rule systems. 
It is here that red  tape arises and where computational aids offer 
promise. 
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